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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost four years ago, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,'
the Supreme Court refused to recognize an actionable claim under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 2 and rule IOb-5
thereunder 3 for alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in connection
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1430 U.S. 462 (1977).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) provides:
Section 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.
(263)
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with a corporate merger.4 The Santa Fe Court concluded that,
absent "manipulation" or "deception," the statute and rule do not
reach breaches of fiduciary duty.5 The Supreme Court's decision
was widely regarded as sharply curtailing the scope of rule lob-5. 6
In what has become an important caveat to the Santa Fe holding,
however, the Court reasoned in footnote fourteen:
[The plaintiffs'] major contention in this respect is that
the majority stockholder's failure to give the minority
advance notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure,
even though the Delaware short-form merger statute does
not require such notice. But respondents do not indicate
how they might have acted differently had they had prior
notice of the merger. Indeed, they accept the conclusion
of both courts below that under Delaware law they could
not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal pro-
ceeding is their sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any
alleged unfairness in the terms of the merger. Thus, the
failure to give advance notice was not a material nondis-
closure within the meaning of the statute or the Rule.7
Today, however, no plaintiff would concede that appraisal is
his sole remedy under Delaware law in a Santa Fe-type situation.
Shortly after Santa Fe, the Delaware Supreme Court reexamined its
traditional merger doctrines and adopted a new approach to the
subject.8 This approach has proved significantly more sensitive
than prior state law to the interests of minority shareholders.9 Con-
comitantly, federal courts have contributed to the protection of
investor interests: noting that shareholders may bring state law
claims based on breaches of fiduciary duty, a number of federal
4430 U.S. at 471. In Santa Fe, minority shareholders objected to the terms
of a short-form merger pursuant to a Delaware state statute. In lieu of pursuing
their appraisal remedies, the shareholders commenced an action on behalf of the
corporation and other minority shareholders seeking to set aside the merger or to
recover the alleged full value of their shares. Id. 466-67.
5 Id. 473-74.
6 E.g., Campbell, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green: An Analysis Two Years
Later, 30 MAI E L. REv. 187 (1979); Jacobs, Rule 10b-5 and Self Dealing by
Corporate Fiduciaries: An Analysis, 48 U. GhN. L. REV. 643 (1979); Ratner,
"Federal Corporation Law" Before and After Santa Fe Industries v. Green, in
Nncrm ANNrmAL INsTiTUTE ON SEcunrrms REcur. SoN-CoRPO1ATE TRANscRWT
SERmIs 305, 322 (Fleischer, Lipton, & Vandegrift eds. 1978); Note, Suits for Breach
of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91
HAv. L. REV. 1874 (1978).
7430 U.S. at 474 n.14 (citations omitted).
8 See, e.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer
v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
9 See notes 85-90 infra and text accompanying notes 75-90 infra.
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courts have concluded that, in certain circumstances, the nondis-
closure of facts needed in order to bring such claims constitutes
"deception" within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.10
The evolution of Santa Fe and its progeny in the federal and
state courts can be seen as an experiment in American federalism.11
Prior to Santa Fe, it was widely felt that state corporation laws in-
adequately protected shareholders from overreaching by manage-
ment. Indeed, the trend towards "flexible" and "modern" corpo-
ration statutes was frequently characterized as a "race to the bottom"
that ignored all interests except management's. 12 The remedies
proposed for the perceived abuses were often some form of federal
regulation. A number of commentators urged a system of federal
chartering of corporations, 13 while others advocated statutory adop-
tion of federal standards of corporate responsibility 14 or an expan-
10 See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980);
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. Alabama Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 77 (1980); Kidwell ex rel.
Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d
209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp.,
560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). See also
Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., No. 78-4508 (S,D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1980); Merritt v. Colo-
nial Foods, Inc., [Current] Fr.n. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 197,689.
1 It is important to emphasize that the term "federalism" is used in this Article
in a colloquial sense only, without implicating constitutional overtones. Speaking
in terms of constitutional federalism in the context of the constitutionality of the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1210, § 137.51 et seq. (1979),
the Seventh Circuit's approach is analogous to the issues addressed in this Article:
The possibility-and perhaps probability-that different levels of govern-
ment will take quite dissimilar approaches to similar problems is inherent
in federalism. But these divergencies are not necessarily dysfunctional;
the states in our system have long served as laboratories of social experi-
ment-free, within limits, to evolve strategies of their own to meet pressing
problems.
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, [Current] FED. SEC. L. RF'. (CCH) 1197,660, at 98,494
(7th Cir. Oct. 17, 1980).
12 E.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YAzE L.J. 663 (1974); Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUE L.J.
875; Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31
Bus. LAw. 991 (1976); Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of
the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 883 (1976); Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Cor-
porations: An Introduction, 61 GEo. L.J. 71 (1972); Note, Federal Chartering of
Corporations: A Proposal, 61 Gzo. L.J. 89 (1972).
13E.g., R. Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in CoiuoRATE PowEn IN
A~mEucA 67 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); Henning, Federal Corporate Char-
tering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915
(1972); Reuschlein, Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a National
Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1942); Schwartz, supra note 12; Note, supra
note 12; Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61
GEO. L.J. 123 (1972); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 898 (1969).
14 E.g., Cary, supra note 12; Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal
Law of Corporations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185
(1964); Vagts, The Governance of the Corporation: The Options Available and
the Power to Prescribe, 31 Bus. LAw. 929 (1976).
1980]
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sion of existing federal securities law remedies.15 Indeed, federal
regulation of various aspects of corporation law became increasingly
common. Both courts 16 and commentators 17 spoke of an emerging
"federal corporation law." Interestingly, after Santa Fe, the roles
have been somewhat reversed, particularly in the Delaware courts.'
8
Generally, it is now the state courts that scrutinize alleged breaches
of fiduciary duty while the lower federal courts apply footnote four-
teen of Santa Fe to extend federal protection to shareholders in
such cases.' 9
This Article shall examine Santa Fe and its progeny from the
preceding perspective. First, for historical purposes, it will describe
15 E.g., Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Hnv. L.
RB,. 1146 (1965); Folk, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 VA. L. Rmv.
755 (1970). Cf. Kaplan, supra note 12 (discussing possibilities for expansion of
rule 10b-5); Jennings, supra note 12 (discussing recent expansion of rule 10b-5).
16 E.g., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961).
17 Fleischer, supra note 15; Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Fed-
eral Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 413-14.
18 See note 8 supra & accompanying text.
19 See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
There appears to be little question that recent Supreme Court decisions have
restricted the reach, scope and effect of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Aaron
v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (scienter required in SEC injunctive actions under
§10(b) of Securities Exchange Act, rule 10b-5 thereunder, and §17(a)(1) of
Securities Act); Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980) (no duty to
disclose under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act arises from mere possession of
nonpublic market information); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc., v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied private right of action under § 206 of the In-
vestment Advisers Act; limited implied private right of action under § 215); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied private right of action
under § 17(a) of the Exchange Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551 (1979) (interest in noncontributory, compulsory pension plan not
"security" subject to regulation under Securities Acts); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103
(1978) (limiting SEC's right to suspend summarily for successive 10-day periods
trading in registered securities); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) (breach of fiduciary duty, without manipulation or deception, not actionable
under § 10(b) of Exchange Act and rule 10b-5); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977) (defeated tender offeror has no standing to bring implied
private right of action for damages under § 14(e) of Exchange Act); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hocbfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required in private damage
actions under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store,
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only purchasers and sellers have standing to bring implied
private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5). This trend is
particularly evident when the recent cases are contrasted with expansive decisions
of the past. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6 (1971). See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977); Stein-
berg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NoTm DA2m LAw.
33 (1979). With respect to § 10(b), Justice Blacknun, dissenting in Chiarella,
stated: "The Court continues to pursue a course, charted in certain recent decisions,
designed to transform § 10(b) from an intentionally elastic 'catchall' provision
to one that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes
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the chartering states' "race for the bottom" in the pre-Santa Fe
period. Second, the Article will turn to the Santa Fe line of cases
in both the federal and state courts. As hopefully will be seen, the
respective positions taken by the federal and state tribunals repre-
sent a surprising and delicate experiment in federalism.
II. "THE RACE FOR THE BoTToM"-A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Shortly after the passage of the Delaware Corporation Law of
1967,20 a critical commentator observed:
The sovereign state of Delaware is in the business of
selling its corporation law. This is profitable business, for
corporation law is a good commodity to sell. The market
is large, and relatively few producers compete on a national
investment in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor."
100 S. Ct. at 1123-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
On some specific issues, however, the Court has departed from this restrictive
approach. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (scienter not required
in SEC injunctive actions under § 17(a)(2) & (3) of Securities Act); United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979) (reach of § 17(a) of Securities Act ex-
tends beyond actual purchasers and sellers and encompasses aftermarket trading
frauds).
If the Supreme Court ultimately rejects the imposition of liability under
9 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in cases relying on footnote fourteen of Santa Fe, a pos-
sible remedy under the federal securities laws for alleged violations of this sort
may be § 17(a) of the Securities Act. In light of recent Supreme Court de-
cisions, plaintiffs may be forced to argue under that section that a private right
of action exists, that aggrieved offerees have standing, and that there is no scienter
requirement. After Aaron, it is clear that the SEC is not required to prove scienter
in Commission injunctive actions based on violations of § 17(a)(2) & (3).
100 S. Ct. at 1956-57. For scholarly comment on § 17(a), see e.g., Hazen, A
Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. Rzv. 641 (1978); Horton, Section 17(a) of
the 1933 Securities Act-The Wrong Place for a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. BE v.
44 (1973); Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin
and Redington, 68 GEo. L.J. 163 (1979).
Another possible remedy in Santa Fe footnote fourteen-type cases is § 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act and rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. Or-
ganic corporate changes, such as mergers or consolidations, require a shareholder
vote, and hence, solicitation of proxies. In these types of situations, shareholders
may be able to seek relief under both § 10(b) and § 14(a). Because the standards
underlying a § 14(a)/14a-9 remedy may differ from those in a § 10(b)/10b-5 cause
of action, the implied remedy under § 14(a) may sometimes give relief where the
§ 10(b) remedy may fail. Moreover, because mergers may involve the Santa Fe-
type situation, in which dissenting shareholders are frozen out, actions brought
pursuant to § 14(a) will bring the Santa Fe state law analysis into sharp focus.
Indeed, the federal-state tension that underlies much of Santa Fe may attach to
any proxy-related claim in which the minority does not receive fair share for its
stock. In contrast to Santa Fe, however, the proxy provisions do not contain a
requirement of "manipulative" or "deceptive" conduct. Thus, § 14(a) may argu-
ably be used to avoid the strictures of Santa Fe. See Hazen, Corporate Misman-
agement in the Federal Securities Act's Anti-Fraud Provisions: A Familiar Path
With Some New Detours, 20 B.C.L. lMv. 819, 850 (1979).
2ODF,. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (1974 & Supps. 1978 & 1979).
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scale. The consumers of this commodity are corporations,
and as we shall see, Delaware, like any other good business-
man, tries to give the consumer what he wants. In fact,
those who will buy the product are not only consulted
about their preferences, but are also allowed to design the
product and run the factory.
21
Although this statement may appear somewhat exaggerated and un-
fair, a number of observers have found it reasonably accurate.
22
For example, Professor William L. Cary, an eminent corporation
law scholar and former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, described state corporation law as a "race for the
bottom" that Delaware had won.
23
Delaware, however, was not alone in enacting a corporation law
designed to encourage corporate chartering in the state. New Jersey,
for example, eager for the revenues derived from corporate charter-
ing, enacted in 1896 what has been viewed as the first of the modem
liberal corporation statutes.24  The Act attracted the incorporation
of the New Jersey trusts, including the old Standard Oil Company.25
At the insistence of then Governor Woodrow Wilson, New Jersey
eventually tightened its corporation law in 1913,26 but the tone of
21 Comment, supra note 13, at 861-62.
2 2 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 12 supra. Professor Manning has char-
acterized state corporation statutes as "towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, in-
ternally welded together and containing nothing but wind." Manning, supra
note 12, at 245 n.37. Another distinguished scholar, Professor Folk, who served
as reporter to the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee, has said of
corporation law generally:
Almost without exception, the key movement in corporation law re-
visions is toward ever greater permissiveness .... Explicitly positing an
objective of "flexibility," statutory revisers . . . have usually sought to
enlarge the ambit of freedom of corporate management to take whatever
action it may wish . . . . Indeed the new statutes seem to be exclusively
concerned with only one constitutent of the corporate community-man-
agement-and have disregarded the interests of shareholders and credi-
tors, let alone more tangentially interested parties, such as employees,
customers, and the general public. . .. [Ilt appears that these trends are
irreversible, absent some presently unforeseeable changes in the basic struc-
ture of the American economy. State efforts to go against such deep-
seated dispositions, even if desired, would be futile.
Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409, 410
(1968). See generally, Symposium on Federal and State Roles in Establishing
Standards of Conduct for Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAw. 856 (1976), in
which the inadequacies of state corporation law were debated, discussed, and
documented at great length (and in which Delaware and other prominent states
had their ardent supporters).
23 Cary, supra note 12, at 705.
24E. DODD & R. BAKER, CASES AND MARImr s ON CoPoRAUoNs 38 (2d ed.
1951); Cary, supra note 12, at 664.
25 Cary, supra note 12, at 664.
26 Id. See also E. DODD & R. BAKER, supra note 24, at 38.
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permissiveness resurfaced in the state's Corporation Law Revision
Commission's Report of 1968:
Since World War I, however, it is clear that the trend has
been steadily toward Delaware incorporation as New Jersey
has fallen further behind in modernizing its corporation
act to meet current needs and practices. The Commission
trusts that this trend will now be reversed, in light of the
revision of the New Jersey corporation laws herewith sub-
mitted.2
7
Despite New Jersey's efforts, Delaware has emerged as the clear
victor in this race.28 As Professor Cary points out, however, if
Delaware had elected not to retain its lead, other states would have
hastened to assume its lucrative position.29
Due to this perverse competition, the adequacy of the protec-
tions that state corporation law provides investors has long been
questioned.30 As alluded to above, this competition rewards the
state that can be most permissive. All too often the competition
is sadly one-sided. Frequently, entrenched management's viewpoint
is dominant in the state capitals,3 ' and little attention is given to
traditional fiduciary standards or to the investor's claim to fair
treatment.3
2
In response to this situation, many commentators have advo-
cated the application of federal standards of corporate responsi-
bility.33 Some observers believed that rule lOb-5 should have been
expansively interpreted to act as the watchdog for all corporate
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A, at x (West 1968).
28 See Cary, supra note 12, at 668:
Delaware understandably does not wish to surrender its lead. Amend-
ing its law in 1969, and again in 1970 and 1971, it is setting the pace.
It likes to be number one. With some justification Delaware corporate
counsel take pride in their role and enjoy the fees that flow from it.
The system "engenders a volume of business for the bar which tends to
be regarded as a vested interest, so that any attempt to retrace steps would
encounter opposition in powerful quarters." Most important, the raison
d'etre behind the whole system has been achieved-revenue for the state
of Delaware.
Id. (citations omitted).
29 Id. 665. Apparently, Nevada has attempted to become the western Dela-
ware but has not had comparable success. Id. See also Comment, supra note 13,
at 871-72.
3O See authorities cited in note 12 supra.
31 Cf. Cary, supra note 12, at 690-92 (discussing links between Delaware
Law Revision Commission of 1967 and the corporate bar); Comment, supra note
13 (same).
32 Cary, supra note 14; Folk, supra note 22; Comment, supra note 13.
33 See authorities cited in notes 14 & 15 supra.
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activity.2 4 Indeed, the impetus for this approach may have been
provided by the federal judiciary itself.35 For example, the federal
courts interpreted rule 1Ob-5 in various cases to protect purchasers
and sellers from persons who improperly traded on the basis of in-
side information,36 to provide relief to participants in transactions
involving misleading corporate publicity,37 and to dispense with the
common-law reliance requirement in cases of nondisclosure. 38
Expansion of rule lOb-5 to encompass the "corporate universe"
was not the only method proposed by commentators to advance the
application of federal standards of corporate responsibility. One
alternative, federal incorporation, was far from novel. Indeed, from
1903 to 1914, no less than twenty bills were introduced in Congress
to provide for the incorporation of companies conducting interstate
business or to require such companies to obtain federal licenses.39
Although never successful, the concept continues to attract the at-
tention of reformers.
40
34 See authorities cited in note 15 supra.
35 McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 939 (1961) (Securities Exchange Act termed "far reaching Federal sub-
stantive corporation law"). See also cases cited in notes 36-38 infra.
36 See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d
453, 462 (2d Cir. 1968) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920
(1969) ("[amny claim that material facts were withheld in a transaction in connec-
tion with the sale or purchase of securities must be scrutinized with care, whether
or not there would have been liability at common law for such a deed."). But
see Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980) (no duty to disclose under
§ 10(b) arises from mere possession of nonpublic market information). This pro-
hibition against insider trading extends as well to tippees. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon
Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
37 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969):
[Alnyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose
it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order
to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such in-
side information remains undisclosed.
Id. 848.
3s See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In
another case, although there was no holding that reliance is unnecessary, the
Court applied § 10(b) where there was a somewhat tenuous connection between
the securities transaction and the fraudulent activity. See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Gas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
3 9 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COMPILATION OF PROPOSALS AND VIEWs FOR
AND AGAINST INCORPORATION OR LICENSING OF CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 92,
70th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 69-A, at 44 (1934) (quoted in Schwartz, supra note 12,
at 71). Indeed, "[tihe advisability of such congressional charters was debated
in the Constitutional Convention, and federal incorporation was recommended by
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson." Reuschlein, supra note 13,
at 106-07 (citations omitted).
40 See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
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A third alternative, proposed by Professor Cary, recommended
the adoption of a federal statute that would provide for, inter alia,
the implementation of federal fiduciary standards, a requirement
that all "interested directors" transactions be fair, and greater share-
holder participation in the corporate governance area.41 Recent
bills introduced in Congress, somewhat resembling Professor Cary's
concept, may be viewed as akin to proposals seeking a federal corpo-
ration law. One such bill, the "Corporation Democracy Act of
1980," 42 would apply to the country's 800 largest corporations and
would address the composition and duties of boards of directors, the
public disclosure of corporate operations and activities, the rights
of employees, the impact of plant closings on affected communities,
the regulation of interlocking directorates, and the accountability
of corporate officers for violations of federal law by the corporate
entity.43
The preceding discussion illustrates the considerable appeal of
federal solutions to problems of corporation law. Ironically, how-
ever, several commentators have suggested that the chartering states'
"race for the bottom" was, at least in part, a result of federal regu-
41 Cary, supra note 14, at 701-03. As outlined by Cary:
To illustrate, some of the major provisions of such a federal statute
might include (1) federal fiduciary standards with respect to directors
and officers and controlling shareholders; (2) an "interested directors"
provision prescribing fairness as a prerequisite to any transaction; (3) a
requirement of certain uniform provisions to be incorporated in the cer-
tificate of incorporation: for example, authority to amend by-laws, initiate
corporate action, or draw up the agenda of shareholders' meetings shall
not be vested exclusively in management; (4) a more frequent require-
ment of shareholder approval of corporate transactions, with limits placed
upon the number of shares authorized at any one time; (5) abolition of
nonvoting shares; (6) the scope of indemnification of directors specifically
prescribed and made exclusive; (7) adoption of a long-arm provision
comparable to § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act to apply to all trans-
actions within the corporate structure involving shareholders, directors
and officers.
Id. 702 (citations omitted).
42 H.R1. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
43 Id. Another such bill, the "Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980,"
S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), introduced by Senator Metzenbaum, has
comparable provisions. See 550 Src. REG. & L. RElP. (BNA) F-1 (April 23, 1980).
Pertinent provisions of these bills, if enacted, would require that a majority of a
corporation's board be composed of independent directors, that the audit and
nominating committees be composed solely of independent directors, that each
director owes a "duty of loyalty" and a "duty of care" to the corporation and its
shareholders, that cumulative voting be used in directors' elections, that a share-
holder vote be conducted on major corporate transactions, and that extensive
disclosure be provided in regard to such matters as employment discrimination,
compliance with environmental controls, tax rates, cost of legal and accounting
fees, and planned plant closings.
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lation in the area of corporation law.44  One commentator has
written:
In any event, all this federal legislation and activity has
gone far to create the belief that the "bad" parts of the old
corporate machinery have been pretty well replaced, to the
further complacency of the draftsmen of state corporation
laws, to which complacency is perhaps also added the un-
comfortable suspicion that what they are doing is not so
important anyhow.
45
It may be an oversimplification to emphasize the causal relation
between federal regulation and state permissiveness-numerous other
considerations were important in the "race for the bottom." 46
Nonetheless, the development of a "federal corporation law" pro-
vided a plausible justification for state corporation laws and judicial
decisions to discount the interests of investors and the public. For
example, the New Jersey Corporation Law Revision Commission
argued that "it is clear that the major protections to investors,
creditors, employees, customers, and the general public have come,
and must continue to come, from Federal legislation and not from
state corporation acts. . . . [T]he means of assuring such protec-
tions must be provided by the Federal Government." 47 The rela-
tionship between increasing federal regulation and state permissive-
ness was a curious one; as will be discussed below, its curiosity was
heightened by some state courts' responses to the Supreme Court's
decision in Santa Fe.
III. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green-AN OV.ERVIEW
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green 48 involved the merger 49 of
the Kirby Lumber Corporation into its parent, Santa Fe Industries,
44 See, e.g., Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?,
50 Comq'ELL L.Q. 599 (1965); Sowards & Mofsky, Factors Affecting the Develop-
ment of Corporation Law, 23 MrsiA L. REv. 746 (1969) (quoting authorities);
Comment, supra note 13, at 896. Cf. Folk, supra note 12, at 958 ("Thus the
overall balance is between increasing state law permissiveness and widening federal
regulation-a development not without parallel in other areas of life and law.").
45 Latty, supra note 44, at 617.
46 See id. at 611-19.
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A, at xi (West 1968).
48430 U.S. 462 (1977).
49 The type of merger involved in Santa Fe is only one of a variety of ways
that majority shareholders can squeeze out minority shareholders. Another,
spawned by the depressed markets of recent years, is the "going private" trans-
action in which the controlling persons of a corporation eliminate public share-
holders while retaining their control and ownership of the business. In 1979, the
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Inc., which owned ninety-five percent of Kirby's stock. Santa Fe
availed itself of a simplified Delaware procedure known as a "short-
SEC adopted Rules 13e-3 and 13e-4 relating to going private transactions by pub-
lie companies or their affliates. See Securities Act Release Nos. 6100, 6109
(August 1979). In general, the rules prohibit fraudulent, deceptive, and manipula-
tive acts or practices in connection with going private transactions and prescribe
new filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements as a means reasonably de-
signed to prevent such acts or practices. Of particular interest, the original pro-
posal for Rule 13e-3 included the requirement that a going private transaction
must be both substantively and procedurally fair to unaffiliated security holders.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14185 (Nov. 17, 1977). Many commentators
expressed the view that the Commission should not attempt to regulate the fair-
ness of going private transactions because such regulation was more properly
within the province of the states. The Commission, in adopting Rule 13e-3 and
Schedule 13E-3, required the issuer to state whether it reasonably believes that
the going private transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders. While
the Commission deferred its decision on the promulgation of a "federal fairness
requirement" until it could review the efficacy of the Rule 13e-3 adopted, it never-
theless continued to adhere to the position that "the views expressed in the 1977
release are sound and therefore specifically affirm those views."
A second situation, similar to the going private scenario, is the "buy-out." In
this transaction, a controlling group causes "its" corporation to sell its assets for
cash, which is frequently then invested in tax-exempt securities. The members of
the controlling group derive substantial benefits from this arrangement. The
insiders, who are often in high tax brackets, are frequently motivated by tax avoid-
ance considerations. The buy-out generally results in no realization of gain or loss
for tax purposes, and thus allows insiders to defer their tax liabilities. Additionally,
highly remunerative employment contracts are often involved. The SEC's Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance has expressed concern that past disclosure in buy-out
situations has not "adequately highlighted the actual and potential conflicts of
interest presented to management or its affiliates in transactions such as these,
which are structured in part to accommodate their tax or estate needs and in
which the purchaser also retains the management under long term employment
arrangements." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15572 (February 1979).
The public shareholder's assessment of the "buy-out" is quite different from
that of the controlling group. The public shareholder receives no employment
contract. Further, the switch from taxable dividends to tax-exemption may
frustrate his expectations. Indeed, had he wanted a tax-exempt investment, rather
than an investment in'a going business that offered a prospect of increased income
and capital appreciation, he no doubt would have purchased tax-exempt securities
in the first place. Thus, in a buy-out situation, the public shareholder is con-
fronted with a choice between an interest in a new investment company or cash
for his stock at a price somewhat above its market price. Perhaps largely for
this reason, the SEC staff has taken the position that adequate disclosure must be
made regarding, inter alia, the reasons for and the effect of the contemplated
"buy-out" transaction, the terms of financing, the fairness of the price offered,
and the rights of stockholders under state law. See Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 15572.
It should be added that frequently the entity that buys the business does so
with borrowed money-hence the term "leveraged buy-out." An investor caught
in such a transaction may well question the fairness of being divested of his
interest and foreclosed from any further participation in an enterprise that sophis-
ticated investment bankers find attractive enough to warrant both heavy borrowing
at today's high interest rates and agreement to onerous employment contracts with
the controlling group. The SEC has initiated administrative actions in response
to certain leveraged buy-out transactions. See In re Spartek Inc., Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 15567, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fr 81,961 (Feb. 14,
1979); In re Woods Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15337 (Nov.
16, 1978).
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form" merger, under which a parent that owns at least ninety per-
cent of a subsidiary's outstanding stock can absorb the subsidiary
without being required to obtain approval by the shareholders of
either corporation." The day after the merger became effective,
Kirby's minority shareholders were informed that they would receive
$150 in cash for each of their shares, and that, if dissatisfied, they
could seek appraisal 51 in the Delaware courts.
52
Santa Fe also provided the Kirby shareholders with an infor-
mation statement containing facts and figures that convinced
S. William Green, one of the recipients, that Kirby stock was actually
worth at least $772 a share. 53 Green did not claim that these mate-
rials were deceptive. Indeed, he built his case on them.54 Green's
basic premise was that the gross undervaluation of his shares was
itself a "fraud" within the meaning of rule lOb-5.55
The district court found Green's argument unpersuasive. 56 A
majority of the Second Circuit, however, accepted it. The prevail-
ing opinion held:
Whether full disclosure has been made is not the
crucial inquiry since it is the merger and the undervalua-
tion which constitute the fraud, and not whether or not
the majority determines to lay bare their real motives. If
there is no valid corporate purpose for the merger, then
even the most brazen disclosure of that fact to the minority
shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent conduct.57
The Supreme Court reversed. Citing a commentator's obser-
vation that Santa Fe and the Second Circuit's decision in a con-
temporaneous going private case 58 were the first appellate decisions
50DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974).
51 The inadequacy of an exclusive appraisal right has been forcefully demon-
strated elsewhere. E.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers
and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 307 (1974) ("[Appraisal] neither serves
nor is designed to serve as a remedy for the fiduciary misbehavior at which the
fairness challenge is directed."); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy:
An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YA_ L.J. 223 (1962).
52430 U.S. at 466.
53 Id. 466-67.
54 Id. 474.
55 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1285 (2d Cir. 1976).
56 Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
57 533 F.2d 1283, 1292 (2d Cir. 1976).
5SMarshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and re-
manded for a determination of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976), dismissed, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) [ 96,243 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In
Marshel, the Second Circuit held that
when controlling stockholders and directors of a publicly-held corporation
cause it to expend corporate funds to force elimination of minority stock-
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to permit "a 1 Ob-5 claim without some element of misrepresentation
or nondisclosure," 59 the Court held "that the transaction . . .was
neither deceptive nor manipulative and therefore did not violate
either § 10(b) of the [Exchange] Act or Rule lOb-5." 60
The plaintiffs also argued that a material nondisclosure had
occurred because they had not received the information regarding
the merger until after it had been consummated. The Court
brushed this "timing" argument aside in what has become, due to
lower court application,61 a most significant footnote.62
Santa Fe was scarcely a surprise after the Court's previous de-
cisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 63 and Cort v. Ash. Hoch-
felder held that there can be no implied private right of action for
damages under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, absent an allegation
of scienter.6 5 The decision was predicated on a strict construction
of rule lOb-5 and its statutory source, section 10(b). 66 This ap-
proach to the language of the statute and rule was expressly affirmed
and adopted by the Santa Fe court.67 In Cort, the Court demon-
strated its reluctance to imply federal causes of action in areas
traditionally left to state law.68 The Court observed that "corpora-
holders' equity participation for reasons not benefiting the corporation
but rather serving only the interest of the controlling stockholders such
conduct will be enjoined pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. 1281.
59 89 IIAv. L. Rxv. 1917, 1926 (1976), quoted in Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at
475-76 n.15.
60 430 U.S. at 474.
61 See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
62430 U.S. at 474 n.14. See notes 76-97 infra & accompanying text. For
the language of footnote 14, see text accompanying note 6 supra.
63 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
64422 U.S. 66 (1975).
65 425 U.S. at 214.
66 Id. 197, 200. Similarly, the Court has recently noted that its conclusion in
Hochfelder rested on several grounds, the "most important" of which was
the plain meaning of the language of § 10(b). It was the view of the
Court that the terms "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance"-
whether given their commonly accepted meaning or read as terms of art
-quite clearly evinced a congressional intent to proscribe only "knowing
or intentional misconduct." This meaning, in fact, was thought to be so
unambiguous as to suggest that "further inquiry may be unnecessary."
Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1952 (1980) (citation omitted).
67 430 U.S. at 472.
60 422 U.S. at 80. The Court enunciated a four-prong test for determining
the existence of an implied private right of action under a federal statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," . . . . Second, is there any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause
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tions are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal
law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with re-
spect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of
the corporation." 19 Both cases evidence the Court's recent con-
traction of the scope of the federal securities laws. 70  According to
one commentator, Hochfelder, taken with Cort, "unequivocally re-
verses the trend toward expanding plaintiff's rights under the fed-
eral securities law." "7 Santa Fe combined the approaches of Hoch-
felder and Cort, employing a narrow approach to construction and
stressing that the regulation of the internal management of corpo-
rations is within the ambit of state corporation law.
Santa Fe is undeniably significant. Had the Court upheld the
Second Circuit's "new fraud" or "equitable fraud" concept, 72 minor-
ity shareholders would have obtained the federal shield of protection
from overreaching that many have argued they need.73  Justice
White acknowledged this concern at the close of his majority opinion
in Santa Fe: "There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary
standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this com-
plaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial ex-
tension of § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 to 'cover the corporate uni-
verse.' " 74
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Recently, the Court evidently
modified the four-prong Cort test. Under the new standard, the primary, if not
controlling, criterion appears to be whether Congress intended, either expressly or
by implication, to create a private remedy. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting) ("[Tihe 'four factor' analysis of [Cort] is an open invitation to
federal courts to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an
analysis not faithful to constitutional principles and should be rejected .... .. ").
See generally Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55
Nonm DA~mE LAw. 33 (1979).
69 422 U.S. at 84, quoted in Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479 (emphasis in Santa
Fe). See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) ("As we have said in
the past, the first place one must look to determine the powers of corporate di-
rectors is in the relevant State's corporation law").
70 See note 19 supra.
71 Lowenfels, supra note 19, at 900.
72The Second Circuit, followed by a number of other federal courts, per-
mitted rule 10b-5 actions even in situations not involving deception. Under the
"new fraud" approach, rule 10b-5 liability could be premised on a wide range
of corporate mismanagement. See generally Jacobs, supra note 6, at 57-61.
73 See note 12 supra.
74430 U.S. at 479-80 (footnotes omitted). Referring to Professor Cary's
article, Mr. Justice White commented: "Professor Cary argues vigorously for corn-
[Vol. 129:263
A REAPPRAISAL OF SANTE FE
Santa Fe makes it clear that a federal claim cannot be stated
under rule 10b-5 without alleging a material deception. Although
theoretically available, "manipulation" will probably be seldom
used, because the Court seems inclined to read that word as a term
of art referring to market operations. That construction is of doubt-
ful relevance to the juggling of a corporation's assets and properties.75
As noted at the outset of this Article, however, Santa Fe had a
second aspect, arising from the Court's comment that failure to pro-
vide the minority with advance notice was not a material nondis-
closure because, as the plaintiffs conceded, "under Delaware law
[the plaintiffs] could not have enjoined the merger because an ap-
praisal proceeding [was] their sole remedy in the Delaware courts
for any alleged unfairness in the terms of the merger." 76 Today no
plaintiff would make this concession in a Santa Fe situation. Six
months after Santa Fe, in Singer v. Magnavox Co.,77 the Delaware
Supreme Court took a fresh look at its merger doctrines and em-
barked on a new course.
IV. PosT-Santa Fe DECISIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
Perhaps influenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Santa
Fe, and the consequent likelihood of reduced federal regulation in
the area of management malfeasance,78 the Delaware Supreme Court
apparently has assumed this protective role.79 In Singer,80 minority
shareholders frozen out by a merger sought nullification of the
prehensive federal fiduciary standards, but urges a 'frontal' attack by a new federal
statute rather than an extension of Rule 10b-5." Id. 480 n.17.
75 See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 ("['Manipulative] connotes . . . con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities."). This passage was cited
with approval by the Santa Fe Court, which suggested that the word "manipulative"
in the Exchange Act was used "in this technical sense of artificially affecting market
activity." 430 U.S. at 477. The Court also expressed the view that Congress
would not "have chosen this 'term of art' if it had meant to bring within the
scope of § 10(b) instances of corporate mismanagement, such as this, in which
the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a
fiduciary." Id. See also Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1952-55 (1980); Falls v.
Fickling, 621 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1980).
76430 U.S. at 474 n.14. Interestingly, prior to Santa Fe, there was some
.authority that under relevant state law, minority shareholders could not be elimi-
nated in a cash-out merger transaction unless a valid business purpose could be
shown. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., Inc., 490 F.2d 563, 571 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) (interpreting Georgia law).
77380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
7 8 See notes 44-47 supra & accompanying text.
79 It is noteworthy that the Singer court viewed Santa Fe as a "current con-
-firmation by the Supreme Court of the responsibility of a state to govern the internal
affairs of corporate life." 380 A.2d at 976 n.6.
80 Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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merger and compensatory damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the
sole purpose of the merger was removal of the minority, and that
the majority had offered grossly inadequate compensation for stock
held by the minority."' In reversing the lower court's dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that appraisal was the exclusive
remedy, 2 the Delaware high court stated that "a § 251 merger, made
for the sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an
abuse of the corporate process; and . . . states a cause of action for
violation of a fiduciary duty." 83 Moreover, the court emphasized
that even the existence of a valid business purpose would not pre-
clude relief to the minority shareholders:
On the contrary, the fiduciary obligation of the major-
ity to the minority stockholders remains and proof of a
purpose, other than such freeze-out, without more, will not
necessarily discharge it. In such case the Court will
scrutinize the circumstances for compliance with the
Sterling rule of "entire fairness" and, if it finds a violation
thereof, will grant such relief as equity may require.84
Hence, under Singer, if it is alleged that the purpose of the
merger is improper, the majority shareholders must prove a proper
business purpose. Further, even if there is proof of a proper busi-
ness purpose, a court must scrutinize the transaction for its entire
fairness and award appropriate relief if a violation is found.
Singer was the harbinger of a new era in Delaware. Subsequent
Delaware cases have confirmed and extended the viability of Singer's
principles. From these decisions, a number of general principles
can be proffered: a majority shareholder's fiduciary duty is not ful-
filled simply by relegating the minority stockholders to their statu-
s1 Id. 972.
82 Singer v. Magnovox [sic] Co., 367 A.2d 1349 (Del. Ch. 1976). A number
of commentators have addressed the inadequacy of the appraisal remedy. See note
51 supra.
8 380 A.2d at 980.
84 Id. (emphasis added). In so holding, the court relied on the Sterling rule,
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 110
(1952), that the majority must "bear the burden of establishing [the transaction's]
entire fairness . . . [which must] pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts."
See Singer, 380 A.2d at 976.
For further discussion of Singer, see, e.g., Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restate-
ment of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YAxu LJ. 1354 (1978); Elfin, Changing Stand-
ards and the Future Course of Freezeout Mergers, 5 J. Coup. LAw 261 (1980);
Rothschild, Going Private, Singer, and Rule 13e-3: What Are the Standards for
Fiduciaries, 7 SEC. REc. L.J. 195 (1979); Comment, Delaware Reverses Its Trend
in Going Private Transactions: The Forgotten Majority, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
567 (1978); Comment, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA.
L. I1Ev. 1101 (1978).
[Vol. 129:263
A REAPPRAISAL OF SANTE FE
tory appraisal remedy; Ii majority shareholders cannot effect a merger
solely for the purpose of eliminating the minority; 86 such a merger
must be for a proper purpose and must be entirely fair to the
minority; 87 a merger made primarily to advance the business pur-
pose of a majority stockholder is proper so long as it has a bona fide
purpose and is entirely fair to the minority; 88 and where a com-
plaint alleges that the purpose of the merger was to eliminate
minority shareholders, such a complaint may often be immune from
a motion to dismiss.s9 The foregoing principles are applicable to
85380 A.2d at 978. See Coleman v. Taub, 487 F. Supp. 118 (D. Del. 1980)
(applying Delaware law).
86Id. 978-80. See Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978). In
Young, the chancery court issued a preliminary injunction barring the merger and
held that, notwithstanding managements assertion that the merger would result
in tax savings and the avoidance of future conflicts of interest, "the basic purpose
behind the merger now before the Court is effectuation of a long standing decision
on the part of Contran to eliminate the minority shares of Valhi by whatever
means as might be found to be workable." Id. 1378.
87 Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del.
1977). The "entire fairness" test applies not only to the price offered for the
stock but to "all aspects of the transaction." Id. 1125. See also Securities Act
Release Nos. 6100, 6109 (Aug. 1979), in which the SEC adopted Rules 13e-3
and 13e-4 relating to going private transactions by public companies or their affili-
ates. For a discussion of the fairness aspects of the rules, see note 49 supra.
88 Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124-25. Thus, the Tanzer court held:
As a stockholder, IGI [the common parent] need not sacrifice its own
interest in dealing with a subsidiary; but that interest must not be suspect
as a subterfuge, the real purpose of which is to rid itself of unwanted
minority shareholders in the subsidiary. That would be a violation of
Singer and any subterfuge or effort to escape its mandate must be
scrutinized with care and dealt with by the Trial Court. And, of course,
in any event, a bona fide purpose notwithstanding, IGI must be prepared
to show that it has met its duty, imposed by Singer and Sterling v. May-
flower Hotel Corp. of "entire fairness" to the minority.
Id. 1124 (citation omitted). One commentator remarks that the recent Delaware
cases suggest that a cash-out merger, even though serving no corporate purpose,
may, nonetheless, pass scrutiny if it serves a purpose of the fiduciary. Rothschild,
supra note 84, at 215.
89 See Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977), in which the chancery
court held that where there is a reasonable probability that the minority share-
holders might prevail because the merger was unfair, the case must proceed to
trial:
[I]t being only at trial that the Court can give the required careful
scrutiny to the testimony adduced subject to objection and cross examina-
tion as well as to other evidence offered in an orderly fashion and also
,test the credibility of witnesses before reaching a determination as to
whether or not the transaction under attack is in fact entirely fair to
minority stockholders ....
Id. 245. As a later decision held, however, under certain limited circumstances, a
complaint attacking a merger may be subject to a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action:
[W]here the terms of the merger are ratified and approved by a majority
of those shareholders who otherwise would have been powerless to stop it,
and where approval is made to depend on the minority vote, then the
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short-form as well as long-form mergers. 90
It remains to be seen whether other states will follow Dela-
ware's lead. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court, relying on
Singer, held that the effectuation of a merger that eliminated a
minority shareholder, even though in compliance with the technical
requirements of the state's merger statute, must advance a corpo-
rate purpose in order to withstand attack under Indiana law.91
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii recently followed the Singer
decision, stating that "a merger effected for the sole purpose of
freezing out the minority interest is a violation of fiduciary prin-
ciples." 92 In contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
Singer rationale is inapplicable and the burden should shift to the com-
plaining member of the minority to show fraud, misrepresentation, or
other conduct attributable to the majority shareholder which would war-
rant setting aside the affirmative vote of the minority for their own benefit.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262, 1268-69 (Del. Ch. 1979). Compare
Michaelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
90 Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979). Applying the
Singer principles, the court reasoned that "the need to recognize and enforce such
equitable principles is probably greater when the size of the minority is smaller."
Id. 1036. The Roland court's holding signifies that an acquiror, in engaging in an
integrated two-step transaction for cash of 100% of the subject company, must
show that both steps had a bona fide purpose and treated minority shareholders
fairly. Note that this principle creates an apparent inconsistency with SEC Rule
13e-3 which "excepts a second-step transaction effected by an offeror who became
an affiliate by virtue of an earlier tender offer, provided that the second-step
(clean-up) transaction is effected within a year of the earlier offer on terms at
least as favorable to the minority as those in the earlier offer." Rothschild, supra
note 84, at 213.
91 Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 388, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977). The
Indiana Supreme Court apparently stopped short of adopting the Singer two-step
rationale. The Gabhart court stated:
The case before us is similar to the case of Singer v. Magnavox Co ...
In that case, the Supreme Court of Delaware ... relied upon agency prin-
ciples of fiduciary duty to hold that a corporate merger is subject to judi-
cial scrutiny concerning its "entire fairness" to minority shareholders. We
see no need to go that far in deciding the question before us. Under the
Delaware view, it appears that every proposed merger would be subject
to having its bona fides determined by judicial review. We do not believe
the judiciary should intrude into corporate management to that extent.
267 Ind. at 388, 370 N.E.2d at 356. See Rothschild, supra note 84, at 215-16.
See also Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
599, 460 P.2d 464, 471 (1969) ("[any use to which [majority shareholders] put
the corporation or their power to control the corporation must benefit all share-
holders proportionately and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the cor-
poration's business"). As interpreted by the Hawaii Supreme Court, "[a]lthough
Ahmanson did not involve a merger, it appears clear from the language of the
opinion that the California Supreme Court would apply the fiduciary duty of good
faith and inherent fairness to such a situation." Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 607 P.2d
1036, 1047 n.12 (Hawaii 1980).
92 Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 607 P.2d 1036, 1046 (Hawaii 1980). The Hawaii
Supreme Court acknowledged that the situation in Perl was arguably different
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held that appraisal is the sole postmerger remedy under that state's
law for aggrieved minority shareholders.93 Although the court was
"not unmindful of the grave unfairness and fraud frequently present
in mergers of this type, especially where there is a 'cash-out' of the
minority stockholders," 14 it concluded that the state legislature in-
tended that the appraisal statute serve as the sole postmerger remedy.
The court recognized, however, the minority's right in the pre-
merger period to seek injunctive relief to prevent the merger's con-
summation. 5 The majority's holding occasioned a vigorous dissent
that relied on Delaware case law to assert that "stockholders who
allege that a merger is 'fraught with fraud or fundamental unfair-
ness' should be permitted to challenge the validity of said merger
at any time, including post-merger." 96 Importantly, however, the
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and other decisions all indicate that ag-
grieved shareholders may bring suit in state court to enjoin a
merger that has not been consummated. Based on the rebirth of
these fiduciary principles, Santa Fe might have been decided
differently today.9
7
from the Delaware cases in that the minority shareholders were not literally
squeezed out. The court refused to distinguish the Delaware cases on this basis,
reasoning that
[i]t makes little sense .. .to condemn cash out mergers on the one hand,
and yet to permit mergers using preferred securities redeemable at the
option of the majority on the other if the minority may be just as effec-
tively eliminated from the corporation by the redemption of the stock as
by the straight cash out method.
Id. 1047-48. See generally Gillerman, The Corporate Fiduciary Under State Law,
3 Corn,. L. REv. 299 (1980); Note, Partial and Selective Reacquisitions of Cor-
porate Securities, 15 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 264 (1979).
93 1n re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 412 A.2d 1099 (1980). For a dis-
cussion of this case, see 549 SEC. M c. & L. RP. (BNA) A-6 (April 16, 1980).
94 412 A.2d at 1104.
95 Id. 1103-04. See also Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (company that merged into a newly created subsidiary to elimi-
nate minority stockholders' interests did not violate § 10(b) and rule lob-5 or
state law prohibiting breaches of fiduciary duty), discussed in 553 SEc. RE. L.
REP. (BNA) A-5 (May 14, 1980).
96412 A.2d at 1105 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing as
persuasive Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979)). See note
90 supra.
97See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), which in-
volved a short-form merger. Applying the "bona fide purpose" and "entire fair-
ness" principles of Singer, the court upheld a minority shareholder's complaint
because appraisal was no longer the sole remedy. See note 90 supra & accompany-
ing text.
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V. PosT-Santa Fe DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Federal Disclosure Requirements Based on
State Law Claims-The Goldberg Rationale
After the Singer line of cases, and similar developments in other
jurisdictions, minority shareholders in situations like Santa Fe not
only can enforce their right to seek redress under state law, but can
obtain under federal law, subject to certain limitations, informa-
tion needed to determine whether management has breached its
fiduciary duty under state law.98 Failure to provide this informa-
tion, according to a number of courts,9 9 may be a material deception
actionable under section 10(b). This federal right to information
extends well beyond the freeze-out merger situation. Indeed, sub-
ject to certain caveats, it encompasses every corporate transaction
in securities that shareholders could have attacked under state law,
had they known the facts. Since Santa Fe, five appellate decisions-
in the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits-have
recognized such a right. 00 These five cases warrant closer exam-
ination. Although involving a variety of factual settings, the de-
cisions represent a coherent and consistent approach to Santa Fe's
footnote fourteen.
Goldberg v. Meridor'0 1 involved a subsidiary's sale of part of
its stock to its parent in exchange for certain assets. The plaintiff,
a minority shareholder of the subsidiary, alleged that the parent's
assets had been grossly overvalued and that the subsidiary had been
looted. 0 2 The plaintiff filed his derivative action prior to Santa Fe
and, after amending his complaint in response to the Supreme
Court's decision, based his claim of deception on the failure of the
interested parent and its management to reveal facts that, if dis-
closed, would have enabled the minority stockholders to enjoin the
transaction in a New York state court. The plaintiff also claimed
that allegedly false press releases issued by the parent when the
transaction was consummated had lulled the minority shareholders
into inaction.
10 3
9 8 This federal right, however, is subject to certain caveats. See notes 126-
63 infra & accompanying text.
99 See notes 100-26 infra & accompanying text.
100 See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980);
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 608 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 77 (1980); Kidwell ex rel. Penfold
v. Meilde, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp.,
560 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
101567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
102 Id. 211.
103 Id.
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The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff's complaint properly
stated a cause of action under rule lOb-5. The court observed that
"[t]he problem with the application of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
derivative actions has lain in the degree to which the knowledge of
officers and directors must be attributed to the corporation, thereby
negating the element of deception." 104 The court found the de-
ception requirement satisfied by refusing to attribute the knowledge
of management to the corporation because management was not
disinterested-a theory of deception based on a long line of pre-Santa
Fe cases.105 The court went on to find that if the facts were as the
plaintiff alleged, and if timely disclosure of these facts had been
made, then the minority shareholders could have brought suit to
enjoin the transaction under New York law.'1 6 Consequently, the
104 Id. 215.
105 Id. For this theory of deception, the Second Circuit relied on several of
its earlier decisions: Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d
Cir. 1972) (en bane); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970);
Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380
F.2d 262 (7th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
106 Id. 219. See also the Second Circuit's statement in SEC v. Parklane Hosiery
Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). There, the court asserted that
had the shareholders of Parklane been aware of Somekh's reasons for the
going private transaction, they, or others, might well have been able to
enjoin the merger under New York law as having been undertaken for
no valid corporate purpose .... This case involves a failure to disclose
when the non-disclosed information could have been used by the minority
shareholders to attempt to enjoin the merger.
Id. 1088.
The Goldberg majority evoked a strong dissent from judge Meskill, who ar-
gued that "the majority has neatly undone the holdings of Green, Piper and Cort
by creating a federal cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty that will apply
in all cases, save for those rare instances where the fiduciary denounces himself in
advance." Id. 225 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Reflecting on Goldberg's significance,
one commentator opined:
[Gleneral application of the standard will allow a large number of
suits involving breach of fiduciary duties against corporate directors into
federal court under rule 10b-5. . . . A federal cause of action will
thus arise whenever a fiduciary opts not to disclose facts that the minority
could use to enjoin him.
Note, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 861, 875 (1978). For other law review articles dis-
cussing Goldberg, see Block & Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement and Breach
of Fiduciary Duty After Santa Fe v. Green, 2 CoRP. L. REv. 91 (1979); Camp-
bell, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green: An Analysis Two Years Later, 30 MAINE
L. REv. 187 (1979); Hazen, supra note 19; Jacobs, Rule l0b-5 and Self Dealing
By Corporate Fiduciaries: An Analysis, 48 U. CQ. L. REv. 643 (1979); Sher-
rard, Federal Judicial and Regulatory Responses to Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 35 WASH. & LE L. REv. 695 (1978); Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HIv. L.
REv. 1874 (1978); Note, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's Resurrection
of Rule 10b-5 Liability for Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority
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case was distinguishable from Santa Fe, and the plaintiff's complaint
stated a cause of action under rule lOb-5.
Recently, the Second Circuit reaffirmed the Goldberg rationale
in liT v. Cornfeld,07 in which the court held actionable under rule
lOb-5 an alleged deception of a foreign mutual fund through mis-
leading disclosure of material facts. Quoting from Goldberg, the
court stated that "an action under Rule lOb-5 can lie if 'there is
deception of the corporation (in effect, of its minority shareholders)
when the corporation is influenced by its controlling shareholder to
engage in a transaction adverse to the corporation's interests (in
effect, the minority shareholders' interests) and there is nondis-
closure or misleading disclosures as to the material facts of the
transaction.' " 108
The Seventh Circuit case, Wright v. Heizer Corp.,1°9 also in-
volved an action by minority shareholders of a subsidiary against
the parent corporation. The plaintiffs sought to set aside the sub-
sidiary's pledge of its most valuable asset, stock in a third corpora-
tion, as collateral for a loan procured by the subsidiary from the
parent. The evidence indicated that the transaction had been ar-
ranged in order to allow the parent to foreclose on the pledged
stock, an action the parent intended to take if minority shareholders
were successful in related litigation involving the subsidiary. 10
The district court, writing before the Supreme Court's decision
in Santa Fe, held the pledge invalid under rule 1Ob-5 because of
overreaching and unfairness."' The Seventh Circuit, faced with
Santa Fe, adopted another rationale. The court first observed that
under applicable Delaware law pledges do not require shareholder
approval." 2 It therefore found that "under rule lOb-5 disclosure
to . . . [the pledgor-subsidiary's] board of directors would be suffi-
cient, unless Heizer [the parent] controlled the board to such an
extent that only the independent shareholders were able to safe-
guard the corporation's interests." .3 Concluding that there was
Shareholders, 64 VA. L. REV. 765 (1978). See also Borden, "Predict sue 'fact
Doctrine Demise: A Threat to Corporate Management," N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1980,
at 29, col. 2.
107 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
108 Id. 917.
109 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
o10 Id. 244-45, 248-49.
111 Wright v. Heizer Corp., 411 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. IMI. 1975).
112 560 F.2d at 248.
"3 Id. (citations omitted). The court also stated as a general principle:
"When an entire board of directors is controlled by a self-dealing director or
shareholder the corporation can only be represented by the independent share-
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such control, and that under Delaware law Heizer had a fiduciary
duty to deal fairly with the subsidiary-a duty that the minority
shareholders could have enforced in a state court 14-the court
reasoned: "Under these circumstances, Heizer was obliged to dis-
close the material facts concerning the transaction to the inde-
pendent shareholders prior to its consummation. This obligation
was not fulfilled: the shareholders were first informed of the general
terms of the pledge and the reasons therefor two months after the
transaction." 115
Sweeping relief was granted. The subsidiary's wrongfully-
obtained pledge was nullified, reducing Heizer to the position of a
general, unsecured creditor.1 6 Moreover, Heizer was enjoined from
entering into any securities transaction with its subsidiary without
first complying with several court-ordered restrictions."17
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v.
Meikle, following Goldberg and Wright, held that inadequate dis-
closure by interested directors may give rise to a federal claim under
rule lOb-5. n8 The court, noting the apparent availability of state
court injunctive relief, reasoned that "[i]nadequate disclosures lull
into security those shareholders who might bring derivative actions
under state law to enjoin the securities transactions if all material
facts were revealed." 19
In Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. v. American
Fidelity Life Insurance Co., 20 the Fifth Circuit became the fourth
federal appellate court to distinguish Santa Fe's prohibition against
employing rule 1 Ob-5 to redress claims based essentially on breaches
of fiduciary duty. The case involved a corporation's repurchase of
its own stock as part of management's alleged attempt to perpetuate
its control of the company by artificially raising the market price of
its stock, thereby discouraging takeover attempts. The defendants
allegedly failed to disclose this inflationary effect of the stock re-
purchase plan on the market price of the corporation's outstanding
shares.12' Adopting the Goldberg rationale, the Fifth Circuit held
holders, to whom full disclosure must be made. Conversely, where disinterested
directors constitute a majority of the board of directors, disclosure to the board is
sufficient." Id. 249 (citations omitted).
114 Id. 251.
115 Id. 249 (emphasis added).
116 Id. 253.
"7Id. 255-56.
118 597 F.2d 1273, 1290-97 (9th Cir. 1979). See 14 U. BRcH. L. REv. 588
(1980).
119 Id. 1292.
120 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 77 (1980).
121 Id. 606-07.
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that this nondisclosure, coupled with the possible availability of
injunctive relief from a state court, provided the basis for a deriva-
tive action based on deception under rule lOb-5.1
22
In another recent decision, Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc.,
123
the defendants, controlling shareholders, sought to merge the sub-
ject company into a second corporation that they also controlled.
Their plans were opposed by a twenty percent minority shareholder
of the subject company who requested and was refused information
regarding the second corporation. After the merger was effected,
the minority shareholder brought suit under rule lOb-5. 24 Plain-
tiff successfully argued that he was a "seller" of securities and had
been deceived by defendants' nondisclosure.125 Healey is therefore
distinguishable from the four cases discussed above because they
involved derivative actions claiming that a corporation had been
deceived. Despite this altered fact pattern, the Third Circuit
adopted the Goldberg rationale and held that "where a misrepre-
sentation or omission of material information deprives a proper
plaintiff minority shareholder of an opportunity under state law to
enjoin a merger, there is a cause of action under rule lOb-5." 126
Given a broad reading, these cases may appear to hold that a
breach of fiduciary duty, coupled with misrepresentation or non-
disclosure, that would have entitled the complainant to seek state
court relief to enjoin the contemplated transaction is a sufficient
basis upon which a post-Santa Fe federal claim may be predicated.
The ensuing discussion reveals, however, that this general principle
is subject to a number of caveats.
B. Caveats to the Goldberg Rationale
For the lawyer who counsels management, the post-Santa Fe
cases present the dilemma of whether his client will be served best
by full advance disclosure to minority stockholders whenever man-
agement is involved in a conflict of interest situation without the
122 Id. 614-15. Dissenting, Judge Skelton asserted that the case did not in-
volve deception. Indeed, it was "much ado about nothing and border[ed] on be-
ing frivolous." Id. 618 n.1.
123 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980).
124 Id. 645.
125 Id. 647.
126 Id. Judge Aldisbert dissented, arguing that Santa Fe's reasoning applied
to the case at bar. He concluded, "[blecause I cannot justify the majority's bold
action in 'federaliz[ing] [a] substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, . . . I dissent." Id. 661 (quoting Santa Fe In-
dus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)). But see Merritt v. Colonial Foods,
Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ir 97,689 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 1980), in
which the district court followed Healey in distinguishing Santa Fe.
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input of an independent and disinterested board of directors. Ad-
vance disclosure may result, of course, in a state law action for
breach of fiduciary duty; 27 absent such disclosure, however, a rule
1Ob-5 violation may ensue. In any event, advance disclosure
does not require that management indict itself.128 As Professor
Ratner has observed: "It is not necessary to say, 'This is a grossly
unfair transaction in which the board of directors is overreaching
the minority stockholders.' You just have to give them the facts." 129
For the lawyer consulted by a victim of corporate skullduggery,
Santa Fe and its progeny demonstrate that the disclosures made by
management must be examined with painful care; that, in certain
situations, rule lOb-5 is alive and well; that, although unfairness
alone is an insufficient basis for a federal claim, there are circum-
stances, subject to certain limitations, in which unfairness coupled
with either a failure to disclose or an affirmative deception remains
a firm foundation for a federal claim; and that in such situations
counsel may have a choice between a state forum and a federal one.
Counsel, however, should not leap to the conclusion that he
has this choice of forum. He must remember the general rule that
corporations are managed by their directors and not by their share-
holders, 130 and that management's knowledge may be attributed to
the corporation, thus precluding a finding of deception.131 Even
before Santa Fe, rule lOb-5 claims alleging that a corporation had
been deceived required proof that the corporation was "disabled
from availing itself of an informed judgment on the part of its
127 See note 106 supra & accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1979);
Alabama Farm, 606 F.2d at 611; Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759, 765 (8th
Cir. 1978); Gluck v. Agemian, 495 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). As stated by the
Fifth Circuit: "When the nature and scope of a transaction are clear, it is not
necessary for the corporate instigators to characterize the various effects of the
transaction as favorable or unfavorable or to evaluate its overall effect; such char-
acterization is a matter of judgment, not fact." Alabama Farm, 606 F.2d at 611.
See also note 136 infra. But see Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., in which the Ninth
Circuit stated: "Corporate officials are under no duty to disclose their precise mo-
tive or purpose for engaging in a particular course of corporate action, so long as
the motive is not manipulative or deceptive and the nature and scope of any stock
transactions are adequately disclosed to those involved." 628 F.2d 1214, 1221
(9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
129 Ratner, supra note 6, at 322. See also Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 608
F.2d 64, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1979); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630
(D. Del. 1980); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens,
475 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
13oSee Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979); Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at
479; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
131 See notes 104 & 105 supra & accompanying text.
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board regarding the merits of the transaction." 132 The need for a
showing of disability is clearer today than ever before. For example,
in Biesenbach v. Guenther,133 a claim of deception based solely on
the allegation that shareholders were not informed of management's
breaches of state law fiduciary duties was dismissed for legal in-
sufficiency. To hold otherwise, the Third Circuit reasoned, "would
clearly circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe." 134
Similarly, in Maldonado v. Flynn,135 the Second Circuit upheld the
dismissal of a rule lOb-5 claim based on the distinterested directors'
decision to modify a stock option plan so as to benefit part of the
corporation's management at the shareholders' expense. In so
holding, the Second Circuit reasoned that since the amendments
modifying the stock option plan were "validly enacted by a vote
of disinterested board members who had been fully informed of all
material facts, their knowledge was attributable to the Corporation
and no 'deception' occurred within the meaning of Rule 1Ob-5." 136
132 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971)
(quoting with approval Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970)).
133 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978).
134 Id. 402. Thus, the court stated:
Santa Fe made clear that absent deception, misrepresentation, or nondis-
closure a breach of fiduciary duty does not violate the statute or Rule....
In effect, appellants are stating that the failure to disclose the breach of
fiduciary duty is a misrepresentation sufficient to constitute a violation of
the Act. We refuse to adopt this approach which would clearly circum-
vent the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe. As Judge Higginbotham
has reiterated:
[Ilt is bemusing, and ultimately pointless, to charge that directors
perpetrated a 'material omission' when they failed to (a) discover
and adjudge faithless motives for their actions and (b) announce such
a discovery in reporting the products of their managerial efforts and
judgment. The securities laws, while their central insistence is upon
disclosure, were never intended to attempt any such measures of
psychoanalysis or reported self-analysis. The unclean heart of a direc-
tor is not actionable, whether or not it is 'disclosed,' unless the im-
purities are translated into actionable deeds or omissions both objective
and external ....
Id., (quoting Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)), quoted
in Lavin v. Data Systems Analysis, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 104, 107 (E. D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978). Accord, Kirtz v. Wiggin, 483 F. Supp. 148,
151 (E.D. Mo. 1980) ("[tlhe mere fact, if so, that plaintiffs, as minority stockhold-
ers, had not theretofore been told nor were aware of the alleged self-dealing may
not be equated with 'deceptive practices' or 'omissions' in the Section 10(b) sense").
135 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
136 Id. 795 (emphasis added). See Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Prods., Inc.,
597 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1979) (failure to disclose that purpose of merger
was to freeze out minority shareholders not actionable under §§ 10(b) and 14(a));
O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 60 (7th Cir. 1979)
(failure to reveal that investment advice was self-serving not actionable under
§ 10(b)); Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 218 n.8 ("We do not mean to suggest that
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Indeed, a careful reading of the Goldberg line of cases reveals
that in actions alleging "deception" the courts have consistently
required rule lOb-5 claims to allege more than the bare availability
of state court injunctive relief. In derivative actions, when share-
holder approval of a transaction is not required, the courts have
reasoned that disclosure to a disinterested board of directors is
equivalent to disclosure to the shareholders. Stated differently, the
knowledge of the disinterested board is attributed to the corpora-
tion, thereby precluding a finding of deception. 137 Of course, in
nonderivative actions, such as Healey, where an individual share-
holder is the purchaser or seller of securities, a lOb-5 claim need
only allege that the shareholder was deceived. 13S Under Healey,
the deception requirement is satisfied by alleging that there was a
material misrepresentation or nondisclosure in the flow of informa-
tion between the majority and the individual shareholder that de-
prived the plairftiff of an opportunity under state law to enjoin
the merger.139
A troublesome issue in determining whether a corporation has
been deceived is the proper definition of a "disinterested" director.
As the Second Circuit held in Maldonado, a director's "financial
stake" in the subject transaction would clearly render him "inter-
§ 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 requires insiders to characterize conflict of interest trans-
actions with pejorative nouns or adjectives"). Bucher v. Shumway, [1979-80 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) fr 97,142, at 96,299-300 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
aff'd, 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 120 (1980) (failure to dis-
close that true purpose of tender offer was to consolidate managements control
not actionable under §§ 10(b) and 14(e)); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1364 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (failure to disclose breach of
fiduciary duty of scheme to undervalue company not actionable under § 10(b)).
See also cases cited in note 128 supra.
Under certain limited circumstances, courts may require that managements
"true purpose" be disclosed. Thus in Rodman v. Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d 64
(2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit stated that "[i]n the absence of some ulterior
wrongful design hinging upon so-called 'entrenchment,' the directors were not re-
quired to put forth in proxy materials an analysis of their otherwise obvious interest
in company control." Id. 71 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the Alabama Farm
case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that an allegation that management had failed to
disclose that it "had embarked on a program of maintaining control at the cost of
inflating stock prices" involved material information under § 10(b). 606 F.2d at
614. Although difficult to pinpoint, these cases may stand for the proposition that
when management has an ulterior wrongful design in embarking on a particular
course of conduct, disclosure of that design is required. Language contained in the
Ninth Circuit's Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., decision appears consistent with this
assertion. See note 128 supra.
'37 See, e.g., Maldonado, 597 F.2d at 793; Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp.
555, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
138 See text accompanying notes 123-26 supra.
139 Healey, 616 F.2d at 646. The court further stated that "[blecause this
result flows from misinformation that harms the plaintiff, it is precisely the type
of situation to which rule lOb-5 is addressed." Id.
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ested." 140 What is not so clear is whether the presence of some
other disability, such as a director's desire to maintain his position
irrespective of the corporation's best interests, or the perpetration
of improper influence or deception upon a director by a controlling
person, including the failure to apprise a director of material facts,
would likewise render the director "interested." Although some
courts have held that only the existence of a financial conflict dis-
qualifies the director,141 the better view is that other disabilities
have the same effect.142 The crucial criterion should not be whether
a director is financially interested, but whether he can exercise in-
dependent judgment on behalf of the corporation and its share-
holders. Any conflict or disability that impairs a director's judg-
ment poses the same threat to the best interests of the corporation
and shareholders, regardless of whether it is financially based.143
Thus, a showing that a director has a conflict of interest-whether
financially related, status-oriented, or otherwise-or that he is acting
under some other disability, should prevent him from representing
the corporation for purposes of rule 1Ob-5 disclosure.
Further, the term "disinterested" should be narrowly construed.
For example, if a corporation's outside counsel sits on the board,
there may be instances in which counsel will be subject to pressure
from interested directors. This may occur if some directors have a
strong interest in a contemplated transaction and if counsel derives
substantial income from his representation. The same reasoning
applies to major business suppliers of a corporation. Truly inde-
pendent actions by either the lawyer or supplier might well signify
a substantial reduction in revenue. This coercion, although argu-
140597 F.2d at 793 (citing Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-78 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) It 96,086, at 91,911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
141 See, e.g., Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(directors held to be disinterested where their alleged interest in subject transac-
tion was to perpetuate control).
142 Although in Maldonado the Second Circuit defined "disinterested" as the
lack of any financial stake in the subject transaction, 597 F.2d at 793, the court
also stated that "[diomination or control of a corporation or of its board by those
benefiting from the board's action may under some circumstances preclude its di-
rectors from being disinterested." Id. 795. See Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp.
555, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
143 See generally Maldonado, 597 F.2d at 794 n.5 ("Nonattribution [of the
directors' knowledge to the shareholders for purposes of rule 10b-5] is justified
when, because of the nature of the transaction, directors cannot be relied upon to
represent the interests of shareholders fairly or when an external authority, the
state, the incorporators, or the shareholders, have decreed that the directors cannot
speak for the corporation."). See also, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v. Moss,
393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 29
(2d Cir. 1964).
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ably subtle, should foreclose labelling either the lawyer or the sup-
plier "disinterested." 144
The preceding discussion outlines a significant limitation of
the Goldberg rationale. Only if corporate action requires share-
holder approval, or if the directors are interested, 145 will nondis-
closure provide the basis for a claim of deception of a corporation
in a derivative action under rule lOb-5.14 6 Even in such cases, how-
ever, the bare allegation of nondisclosure will not suffice to state a
federal claim.147  A second limitation imposed by Santa Fe is that
the aggrieved shareholder may also be required to allege that, had
the corporate malfeasance been disclosed, state court remedies would
have been available.148  In this vein, a question left unanswered
after Santa Fe is whether the complainant must show not only that
a suit in state court could have been brought, but also that such a
suit would have been won. The courts are split on this issue. 49
While the Ninth Circuit seems to require that the complainant
show that he would have been awarded relief in the state court
action,' 50 the Second Circuit appears to require only the bare avail-
' 44 1n Maldonado, however, the Second Circuit concluded that a director vho
was a partner in a law firm that received substantial fees from the subject corpora-
tion was "disinterested." The court reasoned:
[To label . . . [counsel] an 'interested' director for purposes of Rule
10b-5 because of his relationship as the company's legal counsel would
be to open the door to an unworkable standard for determining whether
there has been deception practiced upon the corporation .... [W]e can-
not assume that a counsel-director acts for reasons that are against the
corporation's interest, as distinguished from the private interests of its
officers.
597 F.2d at 794.
The role and number of outside directors is not a novel concern. Nearly a
half-century ago, Justice Douglas described and offered a solution to the problem:
[B]oards wholly or dominantly filled with "shirtsleeve" directors drawn
from the executive management, without outside representation, are apt to
suffer from myopia and lack of perspective. It is one thing to operate
a business efficiently, but it is quite another to be sufficiently detached
from the business to be able to see it in relation to its competitors, trade
trends, and the like.. . . The minimal requirements in this regard are
statutory provisions that a majority of the board shall be composed of
stockholders who are not employees or officers of the corporation ....
Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1313-15 (1934).
See Speech by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams, "The Role of Inside Counsel
in Corporate Accountability," [Current] FED. SEC. L. EaP. (CCH) j 82,318, at 82,
374-75 (Oct. 4, 1979). See also Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel
in the Corporate Accountability Process, 4 CoRP. L. REv. 3 (1981).
145 See notes 136-44 supra & accompanying text.
146 See cases cited in note 100 supra.
147 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474 n.14; cases cited in note 100 supra.
148 430 U.S. at 474 n.14.
149 See notes 150-63 infra & accompanying text.
'
5 o See Kidwell, 597 F.2d at 1294.
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ability of such a state action.151 Between these two extremes are
the Third and Fifth Circuits. Whereas the Fifth Circuit requires
the plaintiff to show "a reasonable basis for state relief," 152 the
Third Circuit's standard appears slightly more stringent, requiring
the plaintiff to demonstrate "a reasonable probability of ultimate
success." 1'3
The formulation of a proper standard is a difficult task. The
maintenance of actions along the lines of Goldberg 15 4 is dependent
largely upon the applicable state law of fiduciary duty. Only if the
151 See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Goldberg, 567 F.2d
at 219.
15 2 Alabama Farm, 606 F.2d at 614 (emphasis added). The court stated:
We hold that all that is required to establish 10b-5 liability is a showing
that state law remedies were available and that the facts shown must
make out a prima facie case for relief; it is not necessary to go further
and prove that the state action would have been successful. . . . [T]he
plaintiff must show that there is at least a reasonable basis for state relief,
but need not prove that the state suit would in fact have been successful.
The Third Circuit's position taken in Healey, see note 153 infra, and the Fifth
Circuit's position in Alabama Farm, appear more stringent than requiring the
complainant to survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or to
survive a motion under rule 56 for summary judgment. Compare the Healey
and Alabama Farm standards with the discussion below of rules 12(b) (6) and 56:
The Rule 12(b) (6) motion also must be distinguished from a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 56, which goes to the merits of the
claim and is designed to test whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as has been mentioned above, only
tests whether the claim has been adequately stated in the complaint.
Thus, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court's inquiry essentially
is limited to the content of the complaint; summary judgment, on the
other hand, involves the use of pleadings, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and affidavits. This distinction between the two provisions is
not substantial, however, because Rule 12(b)(6) provides that if "mat-
ters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment .... "
5 C. WIcHrr & A. ML.LER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 1356 (1969).
153Healey, 616 F.2d at 647 (emphasis added). Thus, the Third Circuit
adopted a standard somewhat similar to that enunciated by the Fifth Circuit. The
court stated:
We . . . hold that in a case such as this the plaintiff must demonstrate
that at the time of the misrepresentation or omission, there was a reason-
able probability of ultimate success in securing an injunction had there
been no misrepresentation or omission .... [W]e frame the test in terms
of a reasonable probability for two reasons. First, we believe absolute
certainty to be both an impossible goal as well as an impracticable stand-
ard for a jury to implement. Second, in most cases the state remedy
will be a preliminary injunction, which looks to the likelihood of ultimate
success.
Id. See also Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d at 250, in which the Seventh
Circuit apparently failed to specifically address this question.
154 See generally Campbell, supra note 106, at 192 ("Meridor and Heizer are
really cases in which the very nub of the complaint was that the corporation has
been treated unfairly by its fiduciaries.").
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relevant state law recognizes the viability of the plaintiff's claim will
a federal claim be possible. Under such conditions, the success of
the plaintiff's suit may well vary, even within a single federal
circuit.1' 5  The incongruity of a federal claim-with federal law
supposedly uniform and national in character-being dependent on
state law is self-evident.
To ameliorate this incongruity, the Second Circuit requires
that the complainant show only a bare availability of state court
relief.150 This approach recognizes the federal interest in full and
fair disclosure. 157 Critics of this position contend that it may allow
circumvention of state court processes, thereby inducing forum
shopping. Under the Second Circuit's approach, a plaintiff who
would have failed in state court may, by alleging the possibility of
success, coupled with nondisclosure, state a valid claim of "decep-
tion" within the meaning of rule lOb-5. This approach is quite
expansive, and some courts have argued that it stretches Santa Fe's
footnote fourteen beyond its recognizable limits.158 On the other
hand, making a federal claim completely dependent on state law
would emasculate the federal interest in uniformity,'59 and would
place an extremely heavy burden on complainants under rule lOb-5.
Further, as noted by the Third Circuit, requiring the plaintiff to
prove a state claim may well be an impossible standard to ad-
minister.1 0
Although the approaches of the Third and Fifth Circuits may
ease the complainant's burden in proving his rule 1Ob-5 claim, they
too condition the recognition of such a claim on the status of the
applicable state law.'0 ' Thus, these positions will encourage in-
consistent results in similar situations, thereby negating the federal
securities law's interest in maintaining uniformity.162 Nevertheless,
15 5 For example, in the Ninth Circuit, which covers nine states, a number
of different dispositions could result in cases having similar factual situations, due to
the application of different state law.
156 See note 151 supra & accompanying text.
157 See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477-78. See generally Note, Suits for Breach
of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91
HAv. L. REv. 1874, 1891-93 (1978).
158 See notes 150, 152 & 153 supra & accompanying text. See generally the
commentators cited in note 106 supra.
'
5 9 See McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 829-35 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); Note, supra note 157, at 1889.
160 Healey, 616 F.2d at 647 (3d Cir. 1980).
161 See generally Note, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's Resurrection
of Rule 10b-5 Liability for Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minority
Shareholders, 64 VA. L. REv. 765, 772-77 (1978).
't-
2 See note 159 supra & accompanying text.
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the Third and Fifth Circuits' views, although not a perfect solution,
represent a workable compromise. That compromise seeks a bal-
ance between the Second Circuit's view, which may stretch Santa
Fe's footnote fourteen beyond its intended meaning, and the Ninth
Circuit's approach, which defines a federal right solely by reference
to the application of state law.
An alternative approach would be to vary the degree of proof
required according to the state of the record. For example, when
no meaningful discovery has been conducted and the record is un-
developed, the Ninth Circuit's requirement of proof of success in a
state action would be far too stringent. Conversely, where a com-
plete trial has been held or a lengthy record has been compiled in
federal court, a stricter standard arguably should apply.16 3 Yet,
looking to the state of the record evades the basic issue presented
by the post-Santa Fe cases. This approach does nothing to address
the tension between the federal interest in the uniform application
of the federal securities laws and the rationale underlying Santa Fe
and footnote fourteen.
VI. FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON FEDERALISM AND INVESTOR
PROTECTION AFTER Santa Fe
What of federalism and investor protection after Santa Fe?
With respect to rule lOb-5 as well as other provisions of the federal
securities laws, the degree of investor protection afforded will de-
pend, in large part, on the applicable state law.164 At first glance,
it appears that the Goldberg-type 165 securities and corporation law
cases that are brought in the federal courts alleging section 10(b)/
rule 1Ob-5 violations present local law questions akin to those with
which the federal judiciary grapples in diversity cases governed by
16 3 See Respondent's Brief in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 14-15, Alabama Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co., No. 79-1362 (October Term, 1979). Thus, the Ninth Circuit required
proof of success on the state law claim where the facts were "gleaned from a
lengthy record." Kidwell, 597 F.2d at 1278. The courts which have applied less
stringent standards were presented with incomplete factual records.
164 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 77-
85 (1975). In Burks, its most recent pronouncement on this subject, the Court
remarked that "Congress has never indicated that the entire corpus of state cor-
poration law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based
upon a federal statute." 441 U.S. at 478. The Court accordingly held that even
in a case arising under the Investment Company Act "federal courts should apply
state law governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue de-
rivative suits to the extent such law is consistent with the policy of the [Invest-
ment Company and Investment Advisers Acts]." Id. 486.
165 Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978). See notes 101-06 supra & accompanying text.
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the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 66  Significantly, how-
ever, unlike the Erie doctrine, under which federal courts apply
state substantive law in order to recognize state created remedies
and liabilities,267 Santa Fe's footnote fourteen, as construed by the
lower federal courts, conditions the existence of a federal right upon
the applicable state law.16 8
This limitation, however, may be more apparent than real.
In a large number of cases, the applicable state law may be unre-
solved: for example, the issue may be one of first impression, or
the state's high court may not have considered the question.169 In
such a case, a federal court, although ostensibly predicting how the
relevant state's high court would rule on the matter, 7 0 may take
166304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern.").
167See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945).
168 For example, in Goldberg v. Meridor, the majority's holding was bottomed
on the proposition that the complainant could have gone to a New York state court
for an injunction had the alleged facts been known to him in time. Judge Meskill
dissenting in part, doubted the validity of that premise. Noting that both the
parent and its allegedly looted subsidiary were Panamanian corporations, Judge
Meskill expressed the view that "it is not at all clear that New York law determines
the availability of an injunction in this situation." 567 F.2d 209, 224 n.9 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978) (Meskill, J., dissenting). The majority
opinion responded that "[tlhe doubts entertained by our brother as to the existence
of injunctive remedies in New York are unfounded," and then observed that "de-
fendants have not brought to our attention any Panamanian . . . prohibition against
derivative actions." Id. 219-20 (citations omitted). Analogous language is con-
tained in the Ninth Circuit's Kidwell decision instructing "the federal trial judge
[to] decide any legal issues that would have arisen in the hypothetical state
suit." Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1294 (9th Cir. 1979).
Note in this context that, as under Erie, the federal court must not only apply
state substantive law but must determine which state law to apply. See generally
Day and Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (a federal court, in a case governed
by the Erie rule, must apply whatever law that the courts of the state in which
the federal court sits would apply).
169 Other reasons may include confusion in the state court decisions, a develop-
ing line of authorities that casts doubt regarding the state of the law, dicta or
ambiguities in state court opinions, and legislative developments that may under-
mine the judicial rule. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,
205 (1956).
170 See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), in which the
Court stated:
[U]nder some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an
intermediate state appellate court ruling. . . . [Tihe State's highest court
is the best authority on its own law. If there be no decision by that
court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state
1980]
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into account the federal interest in full and fair disclosure. Even
if this result follows, the state's countervailing interest in maintain-
ing areas of independence remains intact because the state high
court is the final arbiter. The federal court's interpretation of state
law is, in essence, merely a recommendation that the state high
court can freely accept or reject when it ultimately determines
the matter.
It can be argued that some federal courts applying Santa Fe's
footnote fourteen exception will deliberately ignore state law, even
when such law has been construed by the relevant state's high court.
Such a consequence is possible but unlikely. For example, the
federal courts applying the Erie rule have, as a general proposition,
satisfactorily determined relevant state law. In all likelihood, this
tradition would be generally followed in a Goldberg-type action.'
7
1
Some commentators have asserted that this application of fed-
eralism ultimately will be detrimental to investor interests. Arguing
that state fairness principles provide inadequate protection, they
predict that concepts of federalism will lead to "[the denial of] ef-
fective relief to powerless shareholders." 172 It should be recognized,
however, that the Goldberg line of cases represents an accommoda-
tion between competing federal and state interests. On one hand,
because business enterprises often have national investor constitu-
encies and national economic significance, the law governing the
relationship between these enterprises and constituencies should also
be national and uniform. 7 3 On the other hand, the fiduciary duties
of corporate management traditionally have been defined by state
common law, which can be restated, reshaped, and adapted to con-
law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the
State.
Id. 465.
17 1 See generally C. WRIGHrr, HAND BooK OF THE LAw OF FEDrAL CouRTs
§ 55, at 258 (3d ed. 1976). On the other hand, it can be argued that the Second
Circuit's rationale in Goldberg, requiring the plaintiff to show only that state court
remedies were available, obfuscates the application of state law and may induce
forum shopping. See notes 156-58 supra & accompanying text.
172 Campbell, supra note 106, at 206. See Ratner, supra note 6, at 323 ("the
approach the Supreme Court is following now will exclude from the federal courts
cases for which there is no effective remedy under state law because of problems
of service of process, venue, security for expenses, and other procedural obstacles").
Query whether the substance-procedure distinction applies in this situation, be-
cause the outcome is not the only consideration. Even though the application of
state procedural mechanisms might preclude relief in the federal action, the federal
judicial system, as an independent system, has a countervailing interest in apply-
ing its own procedural rules. As such, if the federal procedural mechanisms are
constitutional, they may be controlling notwithstanding contrary state provisions.
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
173 See notes 159 & 162 supra & accompanying text.
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temporary local needs without legislative change.174 Thus, the
Goldberg and Singer v. Magnavox 175 lines of cases indicate that the
degree of investor protection in this area may often depend on the
interaction between federal and state law. Indeed, a recent series
of events suggests that state courts, at times, may be more inclined
to protect shareholder interests than federal courts.
In Burks v. Lasker,17 the Supreme Court considered whether a
quorum of four statutorily disinterested directors within the con-
text of the Investment Company Act 177 could bar a shareholder's
derivative action brought against their fellow directors on the
ground that, in exercising their good faith business judgment, the
disinterested directors concluded that the continuation of the law-
suit was contrary to the company's best interests. 17 Rather than
directly answering this question, the Supreme Court articulated a
two-pronged test. First, it must be determined whether the appli-
cable state laws permit the disinterested directors to bar a share-
holder's derivative action against fellow directors. 179 Second, if the
answer to the foregoing is in the affirmative, the federal court must
dismiss the suit, "unless the state laws permit actions prohibited by
the [federal statute], or unless 'their application would be incon-
sistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action.' "Iso
The Court suggested that, under this standard, the policies under-
lying the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts would,
in certain circumstances, allow termination of a derivative suit by
disinterested directors if state law so permitted.' 8' The Court re-
manded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion,
and consideration of what the applicable state law provided13
2
Maldonado v. Flynn,8 3 discussed above in the context of rule
lOb-5, also involved a Burks issue. In Maldonado, the plaintiffs
174 See generally Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. at 477-78; Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at
477-78.
t7j Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See notes 80-84 supra &
accompanying text.
176441 U.S. 471 (1979).
17715 U.S.C. §§80a-2(a)(19), 80a-10 (1976).
178 441 U.S. at 473-74.
179 Id. 478.
180Id. 479 (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465
(1975)).
181441 U.S. at 486. See id. 487 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("it seems to
me that a situation could very well exist where state law conflicts with federal
policy"). But see id. 487 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I cannot
agree with the implication in the Court's opinion . . . that there is any danger
that state law will conflict with federal policy").
182 Id. 486.
183597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 135 & 136
supra.
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alleged that proxy statements used in connection with the election
of the subject corporation's board of directors were false and mis-
leading because they failed to disclose the circumstances surround-
ing modification of a stock option plan. In reversing the district
court, 18 4 the Second Circuit held that a reasonable shareholder could
have considered the nondisclosed information important, and re-
manded the issue.' 85 Thereafter, the defendant directors established
a special litigation committee composed of two newly appointed
directors. The committee, after conducting an investigation, recom-
mended that the derivative suit be terminated because it was not in
the corporation's best interests.'86 The defendants thereupon moved
for summary judgment. Applying the test enunciated in Burks,
the district court granted the motion.187 Following an Eighth
Circuit decision, Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,8 8 Judge Weinfeld
stated that "under Delaware law a committee of disinterested
directors, properly vested with the power of the board, may in the
exercise of their business judgment require the termination of a
derivative suit brought on the corporation's behalf." 189 Upon turn-
ing to Burks's second prong, the court held that the federal policies
underlying section 14(a) would not be frustrated by termination of
the derivative suit and that, accordingly, the suit should be dis-
missed.190 Several recent federal decisions have taken similar stances
toward the business judgment rules of Delaware and other states, and
have dismissed derivative suits on the basis of recommendations
made by special litigation committees composed of disinterested
directors.' 91
84 448 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
185 597 F.2d at 796-98.
186 Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
187485 F. Supp. 274, 278, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
188603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
189 485 F. Supp. at 279.
190 Id. 280-87. Answering both of Burks' prongs affirmatively, the court com-
mented that "if a committee of independent, personally disinterested directors of
Zapata has determined in good faith that in its business judgment the continuation
of this action is not in the best interests of that corporation, the action must be dis-
missed." Id. 282. But see Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 60-62 (2d Cir. 1980)
(dismissal of derivative suit improper where defendant directors who sought dis-
missal stood in a "dual relation" that prevented an unbiased exercise of judgment).
191 Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 206 (1980) (California law); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (Delaware law); Genzer v.
Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Michigan law); Siegal v.
Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dicta; Delaware law); Lewis v. Adams,
No. 77-266C (N.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 1979) (Delaware law). See also Rosengarten
v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v. Exxon
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d
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Apparently, however, these federal interpretations of state busi-
ness judgment rules underestimated the sensitivity of some state
courts to investor interests. For example, the plaintiffs in Maldo-
nado, in addition to their federal claims, brought suit in the Dela-
ware Chancery Court on various state law claims.192 Defendants
argued, as they did in federal court, that the business judgment rule
required dismissal of the state law claims. 93 Noting the spate of
recent federal decisions allowing disinterested directors to terminate
derivative suits,194 the Delaware chancellor stated:
All of these cited federal cases . . . incorrectly assume
that State law necessarily enables the corporate directors
(or a committee thereof) to compel the dismissal of a pend-
ing stockholder's derivative suit by invoking the business
judgment rule. . . . It is clear, however, that under well
settled Delaware law, the directors cannot compel the dis-
missal of a pending stockholder's derivative suit which
seeks redress for an apparent breach of fiduciary duty, by
merely reviewing the suit and making a business judgment
that it is not in the best interests of the corporation. 195
The court rejected the defendant's attempt to dismiss the suit.' 96
Currently on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court,19 7 the chancery
court's decision provides persuasive evidence that some state courts
are displaying heightened concern for shareholder interests,198
51 (2d Cir. 1980) (Ohio law unclear); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco, Inc.,
495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (dismissal improper under Virginia law);
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (dismissal improper
under Delaware law).
192 Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), subsequently dis-
missed on res judicata grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980), appeal accepted,
No. 113-1980 (Del. June 5, 1980) (argued Oct. 16, 1980).
'93 413 A.2d at 1255-56.
194Id. 1256-57 (citing Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980)); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Adams, No. 77-
266C (N.D. Okla., Nov. 15, 1979); Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979).
'95 Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1257.
196 Id. 1263.
197 See note 192 supra.
'
98 Two recent state court decisions in Texas rejected attempts by defendants
to dismiss derivative actions on the basis of recommendations of the board of
directors. Sonics Int'l, Inc. v. Dorchester Enter., Inc., 593 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980); Zauber v. Murray Say. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
But see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979) (New York Court of Appeals recognized propriety of committee com-
posed of disinterested directors to terminate shareholder derivative action against
fellow directors; the court permitted inquiry only in regard to assessment of the
19801
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and indeed, may be ahead of the federal courts in certain
respects. 199
The preceding discussion illustrates that the federal and state
courts are engaged in a novel experiment in federalism. A theme
underlying the Delaware cases, such as Singer and Maldonado,
200
and the post-Santa Fe federal cases, is that of corporate account-
ability. Both the federal and state courts are becoming less tolerant
of director self-dealing and conflicts of interest that inflict hardship
on the investing public. 20 1 The Goldberg line of cases, drawing
both on the new approach of the Delaware courts and on the federal
interest in full and fair disclosure, represents this school of
thought.20 2 Viewed in this light, these cases, far from emasculating
the state law of fiduciary duty, may well help form a desirable rela-
tionship among compatible federal and state interests.
This conclusion is supported by the curious relationship that
has existed in the past between state and federal regulation of cor-
porate malfeasance. As suggested above, state inaction in the field
may have been due in part to perceptions that the federal govern-
ment was primarily responsible for the protection of shareholders. 20 3
Santa Fe, and other decisions cutting back on the scope of the
"federal corporation law," have brought into question the continued
validity of such views. Consequently, there may well be new pres-
sures on the states to provide for the protection of investors, as state
courts and legislatures may no longer perceive the federal govern-
ment as the primary source of regulation. This observation of the
state-federal relationship in the corporate area is consistent with the
recent movement toward increased state court sensitivity to share-
holder interests and suggests that state protections for investors may
continue to develop.
"independence" of committee's members and the appropriateness and adequacy
of investigative procedures selected and pursued by committee).
199 It is interesting to note that subsequent to the Delaware Chancery Court's
decision in Maldonado, two federal courts have applied that decision's rationale
to preclude dismissal under the applicable state law. Abella v. Universal Leaf
Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Virginia law); Maher v. Zapata
Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (Delaware law). For further com-
mentary on the subject, see Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Share-
holder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U. L. 11Ev. 96
(1980); Gammon, Derivative Suits, 12 REv. SEc. REG. 887 (1979); Steinberg,
The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder Derivative
Suits, 35 U. Mr~m L. RPv. 1 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in
Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. 1Ev. 600 (1980).
200 See notes 77-90 supra & accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., notes 77-90 & 136 supra & accompanying text.
202 See notes 98-126 supra & accompanying text.
203 See notes 44-47 supra & accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
One approach in analyzing recent federal and state court de-
cisions in the rule 1Ob-5 and related corporate areas is from the
perspective of federalism. These decisions may well underscore
that the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, has be-
come acutely aware that undue extension of the rule 1Ob-5 remedy
into previously untouched areas may displace regulation that has
traditionally been within the purview of the states. On the other
hand, the Goldberg line of cases, particularly when viewed in con-
junction with recent Delaware decisions, may well reflect a desirable
accommodation between federal and state interests. The extent to
which the federal and state courts may continue on this experi-
mental path in federalism is not yet certain. Their journey, how-
ever, should receive the attention of all corporate practitioners
and academicians.
